Isolated
clean roomAuth seeded, profile mounted, nothing from host config. Clean room with exactly what I picked.
harnessed <stack> One executable launches an isolated pod with your AI harness, an MCP hub, and optional shared services.
Every stack shares the same base image, host mounts, and auth. The config layer is always assembled and isolated — never a live host bind-mount.
Auth seeded, profile mounted, nothing from host config. Clean room with exactly what I picked.
harnessed <stack> Claude Code format is the single source of truth. Other harnesses adapt out of it, with no re-authoring.
Native. Mounts the profile directly.
Via claude-hooks-bridge.
Reads .claude/skills/** natively; MCP via hatago.
Planned — MCP via hatago.
Planned — MCP via hatago.
Pick a harness, add recipes (MCP servers and skills). Author one stack.yaml.
harnessed build assembles a committed profile, scans the supply chain, and builds pinned images.
Launch an isolated pod: harness plus hatago plus shared services. Exactly what the stack declares, nothing more.
Every stack runs pnpm, a build-time scan gate, an egress firewall, and secrets that never touch an image layer.
No npm or npx. pnpm dlx replaces npx; minimumReleaseAge cooldowns and lifecycle-script default-deny ship in the base image.
osv-scanner and pip-audit run always; snyk when a token is present. Builds fail on high severity.
Per-instance iptables allow-list via NET_ADMIN. The harness reaches only what you permit.
Auth, scanner tokens, and 1Password refs reach the instance as env or read-only mounts, never an image layer or repo file.
A systemd user timer re-scans installed images online so a CVE disclosed after build still surfaces.
Podman or Docker is all you need. Apple container support is a tracked follow-up.
install curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/drmikecrowe/harnessed/main/install.sh | bash build an isolated stack harnessed build tracer-time run it harnessed tracer-time Three projects solve adjacent problems. Pick the one that matches your threat model and workflow.
| Project | Primary use case | Auth model | Threat model | Runtime | AI harnesses |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| harnessed | Power-user daily driver across multiple AI harnesses | Seamless; host credentials shared into container | Contain the AI, not the repo | Podman (rootless) or Docker | claude, omp, opencode (antigravity, codex planned) |
| NVIDIA OpenShell | Enterprise sandboxing with policy enforcement | Credential providers inject keys; never exposed | Full defense-in-depth | K3s inside Docker | Claude, OpenCode, Codex, Copilot |
| Anthropic devcontainer | VS Code team dev environments | Per-container setup | Consistent team environments | Docker / Dev Containers | Claude |
| Trail of Bits | Security auditing of untrusted code | Fully isolated | Malicious repos / adversarial input | Docker | Claude |